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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
fense62 to mitigate punitive63 or reduce compensatory damages 4 may be inter-
posed where the facts tend but fail to prove the truth of the defamation.01 It is
to be noted that in pleading mitigation the particular circumstances must be
stated, including the sources of the defendant's information and the grounds for
his belief to show the absence of actual malice.66
The majority in the instant case reasoned that the defenses were insufficient,
since they tended to establish the truth of a statement different from that made
in the publication. The Court stated that "indictment" ordinarily refers to legal
process rather than to condemnation in a moral sense; the defense of truth,
based on the assumption that the jury could accept the broader meaning, must
fall, since it is not even related to the libelous matter.
Dismissal of Prima Facie Case Disallowed
In Flander v. City of Yonkers,67 plaintiff brought three causes of action 8
based on the wrongful shooting of plaintiff's intestate, allegedly in an effort by two
police officers to effect an arrest. The present appeal concerns itself only with
the cause of action based on negligence, which upon defendant's motion was
dismissed in the lower court; this was affirmed in the Appellate Division.6 9 The
Court of Appeals reversed, on the ground that plaintiff need only establish a prima
facie case of negligence to take the case to the jury.
The weight of authority in this jurisdiction supports the proposition that
where there is a conflict of evidence, as in the present case, it is within the prov-
ince of the jury to decide on the issue of credibility and give appropriate weight
to the proffered evidence.70 It is equally well established that upon defendant's
motion to dismiss, the .trial court should for the purposes of the motion accept
plaintiff's evidence as true, and regard it in the most favorable light to determine
62. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 262 defines a partial defense as "matter tending
only to mitigate or reduce damages," and the section requires that It be desig-
nated as such in the answer.
63. Punitive damages are held to be available as to a libel published with
actual malice; the term includes also a carelessly published libel even If published
by an agent. Crave v. Bennett, 177 N. Y. 106, 69 N. E. 274 (1904).
64. Gressman. v. Morning Journal Ass'n, 197 N. Y. 474, 90 N. E. 1131 (1910);
Lanpher v. Clark, 149 N. Y. 472, 44 N. E. 182 (1896).
65. Ibid.
66. Flickenstein v. Friedman, supra, note 57.
67. 309 N. Y. 114, 127 N. E. 2d 838 (1955).
68. (a) action against the city for having knowingly and negligently em-
ployed unreliable police officers. (b) action for assault and battery. (c) action
for negligence against the police officers.
69. 283 App. Div. 970, 130 N. Y, S. 2d 895 (2d Dep't 1954).
70. Kraus v. Birnbavr , 200 N. Y. 130, 93 N. E. 474 (1910);,Meiselman v.
Crown Heights Hosp., 285 N. Y. 389, 34 N. E. 2d 367 (1941); acowsLk v. Long
Island3 R.R. Co., 292 N. Y. 448, 55 N. E. 2d 497 (1944).
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whether a prima fade case of negligence has been proved.71 The issue of the
plaintiff's intestate's contributory negligence, being clearly a question for the
jury, was not elaborated upon by the Court.
Burden of Proof
The Court of Appeals was faced with a difficult problem of burden of proof
in an unusual accident case in Cole v. Swagler.72 Here the owner-driver and a
passenger were -killed when the car went off the highway. The vehicle traveled 177
feet, striking two trees, uprooting one, passing through bushes, and finally broke
itself in half before coming to a stop. The pavement was dry, the weather dear,
and there were no living eyewitnesses to the accident. The relative positions of
the bodies, when found, indicated that Swagler, the defendant's intestate, was
driving. The Court reversed the trial court and the Appellate Division, and held
there was insufficient evidence to take to the jury the question of defendant's
alleged negligence and whether it was the proximate cause of the accident.
In a death case the plaintiff is not held to as high a degree of proof of the
cause of action as where the injured plaintiff can himself describe the occurrence. 73
In order to apply this rule, however, there must be a showing of facts from which
negligence may be inferred.74 In the instant case the Court held that in order to
hold defendant liable for the death of Cole, the evidence must show (1) that
Swagler was in control of the car at the time of the accident; (2) that Swagler
was negligent in his operation of the car, and (3) that the negligent operation by
Swagler was the proximate cause of the crash in which Cole died.
The first requirement was deemed satisfied, as the only reasonable inference
from the relative positions of the bodies after the accident was that Swagler
was driving his own car.75 As to the second requirement, the Court found that
the jury had a right to find that the car was travelling at a high rate of speed,
due to the physical circumstances surrounding the crash. However, the mere fact
that the car left the road did not give rise to a presumption of negligence, as the
accident might have occurred due to other causes, such as a mechanical defect.
76
The third requirement of proximate cause was not met by the evidence, as proof
of speed alone will not serve as a casual connection between the defendant's
71. Cohen v. Consolidated Gas Co., 137 App. Div. 213, 121 N. Y. Supp. 956
(1st Dep't 1910); aff'd, 202 N. Y. 578, 96 N. E. 1113 (1911).
72. 308 N. Y. 325, 125 N. E. 2d 592 (1955).
73. Noseworthy v. City of New York, 298 N. Y. 76, 80 N. E. 2d 744 (1948).
74. Wank v. Ambrosino, 307 N. Y. 321, 121 N. E. 2d 246 (1954).
75. Where bodies are so scattered as to render impossible a determination
of who was driving, the court will not presume that the owner drove. Toume v.
Bunce, 307 N. Y. 969, 122 N. E. 2d 751 (1954).
76. A guest assumes the risk of mechanical defect in an automobile which is
not known to the owner. Higgins v. Mason, 255 N. Y. 104, 174 N. E. 77 (1931).
